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NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an equitable action brought by Respondents for
specific enforcement of a Uniform Real Estate Contract entered
into by and between the parties.
II.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The Sixth Judicial District Court granted Respondents'
Motion for Summary Judgment requiring Appellants to transfer
title to certain real property to Respondents upon payment by
Respondents to Appellants of certain sums, each party to bear
its own costs and attorney's fees.
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III.

NATURE

OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants ask this Court to reverse the judgment of the
district court in tote, remanding the matter for trial.

Respon-

dents, by way of cross-appeal, also seek the reversal of the
judgment of the district court insofar as said court refused to
grant an award of costs and attorney's fees in favor of
Respondents.

Further, Respondents ask this Court to award costs

and attorney's fees in favor of Respondents on this appeal.

IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about the 20th day of December, 1975, Appellants, as
buyers, entered into a written Agreement with H. Vance and
Emily B. Pope, as sellers, for the purchase and sale of certain
real and personal properties situated in Panguitch, Garfield
County, State of Utah (Record 110, 121).

Said "Pope" Agreement

(R. 7-26) concerned the transfer of a motel, cafe, trailer park,
and several, residential dwellings for the price of $270,000.00
(R. 110).

Warranty Deeds to said real property were required,

by paragraph 19 of said Agreement to be placed in escrow with
First State Bank, Panguitch Branch, to be released only upon
fulfillment of all of the terms and requirements of the escrow
agreement.

Additionally,

Appellants were required by paragraph

16 of said Agreement to execute and deliver to the Popes real

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

estate mortgages on additional real properties owned by Appellants
including their personal residences and a piece of property
located near Panguitch Lake (Transcript 10).

Said mortgages

constituted second liens against the residences as further
security for all real and personal properties purchased on the
"Pope" Agreement.
On or about the 10th day of April, 1978, Appellants, as
sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 4-5)
with Tom C. Thorpe, a strawman for Respondents.

All negotiations

relating to said Uniform Real Estate Contract were in fact
between Appellants and Respondents (T. 11-12).

Said "Thorpe"

Contract concerned the purchase and sale of only a portion of the
real property purchased under the "Pope" Agreement for a sum of
$300 ,000. 00 (R. 122; T. 2 I 12).
Using a standard printed form supplied and prepared by
Respondent, Nick Faulkner, a real estate broker (T. 22), the
parties acknowledged, in paragraph 6, the underlying obligation
against the property pursuant to the "Pope" Agreement.

However,

the parties supplemented the printed form with the typewritten
clause "which shall be the Sellers obligation to pay and
discharge," referring to the "Pope" obligation.

At the time of

contracting and upon payment by Respondents to Appellants of a
$35,000.00 down payment required in the "Thorpe" Contract, the
outstanding obligation on said Contract was in fact smaller than
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than the unpaid balance on the "Pope" Agreement (T. 12-13}.
The subject "Thorpe" Contract also

c~ntains

the following

provision, the effect of which is the basis for this dispute
between the parties:
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute,
and maintain loans secured by said property of not
to exceed the then unpaid contract balance hereunder,
bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed EIGHT
percent (8%) per annum and payable in regular monthly
installments provided that the aggregate monthly
installment payments required to be made by Seller
on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be made by the Buyer under
this contract. When the principal due hereunder has
been reduced to the amount of any such loans and
mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer
agrees to accept title to the above-described property subject to said loans and mortgages.
On or about the 18th day of September and again on or about
the 18th day of November, 1980, Respondents, through their
counsel, made written demand upon Appellants for conveyance of
the property sold under the "Thorpe" Contract pursuant to paragraph 8 therein (R. 111).

Appellants provided Respondents with

a written refusal to each demand, together with an explanation as
to the inapplicability of paragraph 8 of the Contract to the
"Pope" obligation (R. 122) •
On or about the 4th day of December, 1980, Respondents commenced this action against Appellants seeking the remedy of
specific performance to require Appellants to convey title to

-4-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the property to Respondents under the "Thorpe" Contract (R. 1-28).
Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
alleging that "no material issue of fact exists in the case and
that [Respondents] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law"

(R. 108-109).

Said Motion was heard by the Sixth Judicial Distric

Court, Honorable Don

v.

Tibbs, on the 16th day of October, 1981,

at which time each of the facts set forth herein was agreed
upon and stipulated to by Respondents (R. 22, 34).

The court,

however, refused Appellants' request to allow the production of
evidence clarifying the intent of the parties concerning the
disputed provision, granted Respondents' Motion, and entered
a final order requiring that upon Respondents' reduction of the
"Thorpe" c·ontract balance to an amount less than the unpaid
balance on the "Pope" Agreement, Appellants must convey the property to Respondent, each party to bear its own costs and
attorney's fees in the matter (R. 135-136).

Appellants respect-

fully appeal from said final order.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF
UNRESOLVED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT CREATED BY
AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that, upon motion, a swmnary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith

-s-
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if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Conversely, if the pleadings, affidavits, and answers to discovery
on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing
party, show that there is any genuine issue as to any material
fact, a motion for summary judgment must be denied.

Jensen v.

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 611 P.2d 363,
365

(Utah 1980).
In their Answer to Respondents' Complaint, answers to

discovery, and affidavits on file herein,·together with the
copies of documents attached thereto, Appellants specifically
raise issues of material fact as to whether the "Pope" obligation
was intended by the parties to be affected by paragraph 8 of the
"Thorpe" Contract.

The court, however, refused to allow evidence

to be taken concerning the intent of the contracting parties,
basing its decision on the parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule has been the subject of voluminous
decisions by this Court.

Generally, when parties have negotiated

on a subject and thereafter reduce the agreement to a written
contract, it is assumed that all prior negotiations are fused
into the contract so that it represents the full agreement of the
parties.

Extraneous evidence is, therefore, not ordinarily

-6-
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permitted to add to, subtract from, or contradict the written
document.

Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction Company,

22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969).

When the subject of a

dispute is the meaning of the contract, the court "should first
examine the language of the instruments and accord to it the
weight and effect which it may show was intended," but if the
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, the court should then properly
"consider parol

evidence of the parties' intentions."

Big

Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977).

Courts

are thus provided a means by which they can look beyond the
terms found in the written contract to delineate the intent of
the contracting
(Utah 1980).

p~rties.

Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377

Facts concerning the respective situations of the

parties, circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, and
the purpose of its execution become admissible to ascertain the
actual intent of the ambiguous provisions.

Continental Bank &

Trust Company v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 892 (1955).
The ambiguity in the subject "Thorpe" contract involves
the apparent incongruity between paragraphs 6 and 8.

To the

standard form recital acknowledging the existence of the underlying "Pope" obligation, the parties typed at the end of paragraph 6 the clause, "which shall be the Sellers obligation to
pay and discharge."

Paragraph 8 is a standard form provision

giving Seller the option to secure, execute, and maintain loans

-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

secured by the subject property in any amount less than the outstanding contract balance.

Buyer thereby agrees to take title

to the subject property subject to said loans when the principal
balance of the subject contract is reduced to the amount of
seller's encumbering loans and mortgages.
The "Pope" obligation does not readily fit into the anticipated "loan" or "mortgage" classification.

The fact that the

parties had a clause typed into the contract unequivocally
stating that the "Pope" obligation would remain the Seller's
obligation casts considerable doubt on the validity of Respondents' assertion that it could be assumed under paragraph 8.

The

typewritten clause carries weight over otherwise conflicting
printed form provisions in a written contract.
Davis, 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977).

Bank of Ephraim v.

The parties apparently expressed

their intent to exclude the "Pope" obligation from the applicability to paragraph 8 by the typed clause of paragraph 6.
This ambiguity becomes more obvious when the contract is
viewed in connection with the comparative balances of the "Pope"
Agreement and "Thorpe" Contract.

At the moment of contract

execution and transfer of the down payment recited therein, the
balance on the "Thorpe" Contract was reduced below that on the
"Pope" Agreement.

If the parties had intended paragraph 8 of

the "Thorpe" Contract to apply to the "Pope" obligation,
Appellants should have at that time conveyed the property, and

-a-
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Respondents should have accepted title to the same subject only
to the "Pope" obligation.

Instead, the parties commenced a

regular course of payments keeping both agreements separate;
Respondents paid Appellants on the "Thorpe" Contract, and
Appellants paid the Popes pursuant to the "Pope" Agreement.

Not

until after two and one41alf years of consistently servicing the
respective obligations separately, and at a time when in fact
the principal balance of the "Pope" obligation had again been
reduced below the balance on the "Thorpe" Contract, did Respondents attempt to invoke the provisions of paragraph 8.

By refusing to receive any evidence concerning the surrounding circumstances, which would have properly enabled it to
"look upon the transaction through the eyes of the parties" and
"know that they understood or intended the ambiguous • • . provisions to mean," the Court prematurely granted judgment on the
merits of the "Thorpe" Contract alone.

Fox Film Corporation v.

Ogden Theatre Company, 82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 {1932).
When the respective parties to a contract place their own construction on the writing and so perform, the Court should receive
such evidence since it may be considered as persuasive as to
what their true intention was.
400 P.2d 20, 22 (1965).

Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304,

Failing to consider any such evidence,

the District Court erred by granting summary judgment.

-9-
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING SUMMA.RY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.

In the lower court, Respondents relied heavily on the
recent case of Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980).

There,

this Court reversed a lower court judgment and ordered specific
performance pursuant to the same provision as paragraph 8
of the "Thorpe" Contract.

However, there are significant dif-

ferences of fact in the present case which preclude heavy
reliance on Hinkle.

There, the issues were simple.

The same

piece of proeprty was the sole subject of two consecutive sales.
The Unifonn Real Estate Contract form was not supplemented by the
parties' desire for one party to be solely responsible for the
underlying obligation.

Neither was there a variance of security

offered under the respective contracts.

In that case, the con-

tract was found to be unambiguous; the underlying obligation
could be assumed, forcing transfer of title.
The contract in this case is not so free from ambiguity.
As modified by the clause specifically obligating Appellants for
the "Pope" Agreement, paragraph 6 conflicts with paragraph 8.
Looking behind the contract to other relevant documents and
extraneous evidence, the conflicting provisions of modified
paragraph 6 and paragraph 8 may reasonably be reconciled only by
excluding the underlying "Pope" obligation from applicability to
paragraph 8.

The clear intent of the contracting parties was to

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

apply paragraph 8 only to subsequent loans or mortgages secured
by the property.
One of the major reasons for this exclusion of the "Pope"
obligation from paragraph 8 was the fact that the two contracts
covered the sales of different properties.

The "Pope" Agreement

included property on which a motel, restaurant, and three houses
are located.

The "Thorpe" Contract covered only the land on

which the motel and restaurant stand.

In other words, Appellants

sold a smaller portion of land to Respondents than they had purchased from Pope.

It would be impractical to attempt to divide

title to the property while the entire title rests with Pope
pending complete satisfaction of the original obligation.
Furthermore, it would be unfair to subject Appellants to a
potential default by Respondents on the entire obligation by
conveying any rights to part of the property which carries the
obligation for the total property.
intent of the parties.

That was clearly not the

Another fact unique to the circumstances

of this case further demonstrates the inapplicability of Respondents' paragraph 8 assertions.

The "Pope" obligation was secured

not only by the property sold to Respondents, but by the other
property purchased by Appellants together with their personal
residences and property located near Panguitch Lake.

Finally,

because of the balloon payments required of Respondents under the
"Thorpe" Contract which were bargained for by Appellants to enable

_,,_
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prepayment and early satisfaction of the "Pope" Agreement, conveyance and assumption by Respondents of the "Pope" obligation
will prolong that obligation by 12 years, unfairly tying up
Appellants' property not the subject of the "Thorpe" Contract
(T. 18-19).

The facts here are much more complex than in Hinkle.

The

"Thorpe" Contract, drafted by Respondent, Nick Faulkner, a real
estate broker, must be construed strictly against Respondents in
case of uncertainty.
P.2d 503, 505 (1965).

Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400
This rule of construction is especially

applicable when the drafting party seeks to invoke the ambiguous
provision against the other contracting party.
Midwest

C.

R~alty

Wells Fargo Bank

v.

& Finance, Inc., 544 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975).

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENTS, AND
NONE SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THIS APPEAL.

Rule 54(d) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Except when express provision therefor is made either in a
statute of this state or in these Rules, costs shall be allowed as
a course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
.
t s . • •• "
d irec

This Court has interpreted Rule 54(d) as leaving

the question of awarding costs in the discretion of the courts.
Hull v. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245, 247 (1955).

The

sound discretion of the lower court on this should not be disturbed.

-12-
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Paragraph 21 of the "Thorpe" Contract provides:
The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they
default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay
all costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from
enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing
any remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes
of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise.
However, no authority is given in the contract, nor by statute,
for an award of attorney's fees in absence of a "default" in the
covenants or agreements set forth in the contract.

In the

final Order from which this appeal is made, the court did not
declare a default or a breach of contract by Appellants as
plead by Respondents in their Complaint.

Rather, the court

ordered Respondents to make certain principal payments to
Appellants and, thereafter, Appellants to convey property to
Respondents.

Without a showing of Appellants' liability,

therefore, either by contract or by statute, the court correctly
required each party to pay its own attorney's fees.

Utah Farm

Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981).
Attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary with the
Supreme Court.

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment

Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955).

Based on similar

reasoning to that of the lower court in requiring each party to

-13-
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bear its own costs and attorney's fees, this Court ought to
require each party to continue to so be responsible throughout
this appeal, regardless of the outcome.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The action of the lower court in granting Respondents'
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed.

Based on the

foregoing analysis, this Court should remand the matter to the
District Court for a trial on the issues concerning the parties'
intentions concerning the paragraphs 6 and 8 of the "Thorpe"
Contract and their respective application to the "Pope" obligation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

z1

day of April' 1982.

C)~~

Robert F. Orton
T. Richard Davis
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
( 801) 521-3800
Attorneys for Respondents

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing BRIEF
OF APPELLANTS to John H. McDonald, BENNETT, McDONALD & BELNAP,
370 East 500 South, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this

27

day of April, 1982.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

